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Abstract
In this work, we consider misinformation propagating through a social network and study the
problem of its prevention. In this problem, a “bad” campaign starts propagating from a set of seed
nodes in the network and we use the notion of a limiting (or “good”) campaign to counteract the
effect of misinformation. The goal is to identify a set of k users that need to be convinced to adopt
the limiting campaign so as to minimize the number of people that adopt the “bad” campaign at
the end of both propagation processes.
This work presents RPS (Reverse Prevention Sampling), an algorithm that provides a scalable
solution to the misinformation prevention problem. Our theoretical analysis shows that RPS runs in
O((k+ l)(n+m)( 11−γ ) logn/
2) expected time and returns a (1− 1/e− )-approximate solution with
at least 1− n−l probability (where γ is a typically small network parameter and l is a confidence
parameter). The time complexity of RPS substantially improves upon the previously best-known
algorithms that run in time Ω(mnk · POLY (−1)). We experimentally evaluate RPS on large
datasets and show that it outperforms the state-of-the-art solution by several orders of magnitude
in terms of running time. This demonstrates that misinformation prevention can be made practical
while still offering strong theoretical guarantees.
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1 Introduction
Social networks allow for widespread distribution of knowledge and information in modern
society as they have rapidly become a place to hear the news and discuss social topics.
Information can spread quickly through the network, eventually reaching a large audience,
especially so for influential users. While the ease of information propagation in social networks
can be beneficial, it can also have disruptive effects. In recent years, the number of high
profile instances of misinformation causing severe real-world effects has risen sharply. These
examples range across a number of social media platforms and topics [9, 23, 11, 13, 29, 1].
Thus, in order for social networks to serve as a reliable platform for disseminating critical
information, it is necessary to have tools to limit the spread of misinformation.
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Budak et al. [4] were among the first to formulate the problem of misinformation prevention
as a combinatorial optimization problem. By building upon the seminal work of Kempe et
al. [16] on influence maximization to a model that can handle multiple campaigns (“bad”
and “good”), they present a greedy approach that provides a (1 − 1/e − )-approximate
solution. Unfortunately, the greedy approach of [4] is plagued by the same scaling issues
as [16] when considering large social networks and is further exacerbated by the added
complexity of tracking multiple cascades which requires costly shortest path computations.
This leads us to the motivating question for this paper: Can we find scalable algorithms for
the misinformation prevention problem introduced in [4]?
The scalability hurdle in the single campaign setting was recently resolved by Borgs et
al. [3] when they made a theoretical breakthrough that fundamentally shifts the way in
which we view the influence maximization problem. Their key insight was to reverse the
question of “what subset of the network can a particular user influence” to “who could have
influenced a particular user”. Their sampling method runs in close to linear time and returns
a (1− 1/e− )-approximate solution with at least 1− n−l probability. In addition, Tang et
al. [30] presented a significant advance that improved the practical efficiency of Borgs et al.
through a careful theoretical analysis that rids their approach of a large hidden constant in
the runtime guarantee. Borgs et al. [3] leave open the question whether their framework can
be extended to other influence propagation models.
In this work, we resolve the question of [3] for the misinformation prevention problem and
achieve scalability in the multi-campaign model. We complement our theoretical analysis
with extensive experiments which show an improvement of several orders of magnitude over
Budak et al. [4]. Since influence in the single campaign setting corresponds to reachability
in the network, our solution requires mapping the concept of reachability to an analogous
notion in the multi-campaign model for misinformation prevention. Our first contribution is
to show that reachability alone is not sufficient in determining the ability to save a particular
node from the bad campaign. In order to address this challenge, we introduce a crucial
notion of “obstructed” nodes, which are nodes such that all paths leading to them can be
blocked by the bad campaign.
Using our newly defined notion of obstruction, we develop an efficient algorithm for
the misinformation prevention problem that provides much improved scalability over the
existing Monte Carlo-based greedy approach of [4]. A novel component of this algorithm is a
procedure to compute the set of unobstructed nodes that could have saved a particular node
from adopting the misinformation. We obtain theoretical guarantees on the expected runtime
and solution quality for our new approach and show that its expected runtime substantially
improves upon the expected runtime of [4]. Additionally, we rule out sublinear algorithms for
our problem through a lower bound on the time required to obtain a constant approximation.
Finally, from an experimental point of view, we show that our algorithm gives a significant
improvement over the state of the art algorithm and can efficiently handle graphs with more
than 50 million edges. In summary, the contributions of this paper are:
1. We introduce the concept of obstructed nodes that fully captures the necessary conditions
for preventing the adoption of misinformation in the multi-campaign model. In the
process, we close a gap in the work of [4].
2. We design and implement a novel procedure for computing the set of nodes that could
save a particular user from adopting the misinformation.
3. We propose a misinformation prevention approach that returns a (1−1/e−)-approximate
solution with high probability in the multi-campaign model and show that its expected
runtime substantially improves upon that of the algorithm of Budak et al. [4].
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4. We give a lower bound of Ω(m+n) on the time required to obtain a constant approximation
for the misinformation prevention problem.
5. Our experiments show that our algorithm gives an improvement of several orders of
magnitude over Budak et al. [4] and can handle graphs with more than 50 million edges.
2 Related Work
There exists a large body of work on the Influence Maximization problem first proposed
by Kempe et al. [16]. The primary focus of the research community has been related to
improving the practical efficiency of the Monte Carlo-based greedy approach under the
Independent Cascade (IC) or Linear Threshold (LT) propagation models. These works fall
into two categories: heuristics that trade efficiency for approximation guarantees [15, 32]
and practical optimizations that speed up the Monte Carlo-based greedy approach while
retaining the approximation guarantees [18, 6, 10]. Despite these advancements, it remains
infeasible to scale the Monte Carlo-based approach to web-scale networks.
Borgs’ et al. [3] brought the first asymptotic runtime improvements while maintaining
the (1− 1/e− )-approximation guarantees with their reverse influence sampling technique.
Furthermore, they prove their approach is near-optimal under the IC model. Tang et al.
[30] presented practical and theoretical improvements to the approach and introduced novel
heuristics that result in up to 100-fold improvements to the runtime.
Incorporating the spread of multiple campaigns is split between two main lines of work:
(1) studying influence maximization in the presence of competing campaigns [2, 20, 24, 19]
and (2) limiting the spread of misinformation and rumours by launching a truth campaign
[4, 14, 7, 22]. In both cases, existing propagation models (such as IC and LT) are augmented
or extended. The work of [4] best captures the idea of preventing the spread of misinformation
in a multi-campaign version of the IC model since they aim to minimize the number of users
that end up adopting the misinformation. Unfortunately, despite the objective function
proving to be monotone and submodular, the Monte Carlo-based greedy solution used in [4]
faces the same challenges surrounding scalability as [16].
Works [20, 8] extend the reverse influence sampling technique of [3] to competing cam-
paigns (such as two competing products in [20] and spreading truth to combat misinformation
in [8]). However, their work differs from ours in an important way: they use a model, different
from ours, where the edge probabilities are campaign oblivious. This alternative model does
not capture the notion of misinformation as well as the model we use, but instead is better
suited for the influence maximization problem when there are multiple competing campaigns
(see [4] for a discussion).
Finally, the misinformation problem has been tackled by a wide range of communities
such as [17, 26, 25, 12, 31, 27].
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we formally define the multi-campaign diffusion model, the eventual influence
limitation problem presented by Budak et al. [4], and present an overview of the state-of-the-
art reverse sampling approach [16, 3, 30] for the influence maximization problem.
Diffusion Model
Let C (for “bad Campaign”) and L (for “Limiting”) denote two influence campaigns. Let
G = (V,E, p) be a social network with node set V and directed edge set E (|V | = n and
|E| = m) where p specifies campaign-specific pairwise influence probabilities (or weights)
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between nodes. That is, p : E × Z → [0, 1] where Z ∈ {C,L}. For convenience, we use pZ(e)
for p(e, Z). Further, let G = (V,E) denote the underlying unweighted directed graph. Given
G, the Multi-Campaign Independent Cascade model (MCIC) of Budak et al. [4] considers a
time-stamped influence propagation process as follows:
1. At timestamp 1, we activate selected sets AC and AL of nodes in G for campaigns C and
L respectively, while setting all other nodes inactive.
2. If a node u is first activated at timestamp i in campaign C (or L), then for each directed
edge e that points from u to an inactive neighbour v in C (or L), u has pC(e) (or pL(e))
probability to activate v at timestamp i+ 1. After timestamp i+ 1, u cannot activate
any node.
3. In the case when two or more nodes from different campaigns are trying to activate v at
a given time step we assume that the “good information” (i.e. campaign L) takes effect.
4. Once a node becomes activated in one campaign, it never becomes inactive or changes
campaigns.
He et al. [14] consider the opposite policy to (3) where the misinformation succeeds in
the case of a tie-break. We note that our algorithms presented in this work are applicable
for both choices of the tie-break policy.
3.1 Formal Problem Statement
A natural objective, as outlined in [4], is “saving” as many nodes as possible. That is, we seek
to minimize the number of nodes that end up adopting campaign C when the propagation
process is complete. This is referred to as the eventual influence limitation problem (EIL).
Let AC and AL be the set of nodes from which campaigns C and L start, respectively.
Let I(AC) be the set of nodes that are activated in campaign C in the absence of L when
the above propagation process converges and pi(AL) be the size of the subset of I(AC) that
campaign L prevents from adopting campaign C. We refer to AL and AC as the seed sets,
I(AC) as the influence of campaign C, and pi(AL) as the prevention of campaign L. The
nodes that are prevented from adopting campaign C are referred to as saved. Note that
pi(AL) is a random variable that depends on the edge probabilities that each node uses in
determining out-neighbors to activate.
Budak et al. [4] present a simplified version of the problem that captures the idea that
it may be much easier to convince a user of the truth. Specifically, the information from
campaign L is accepted by users with probability 1 (pL(e) = 1 if edge e exists and pL(e) = 0
otherwise) referred to as the high effectiveness property. In [4] it is shown that even with these
restrictions EIL with the high effectiveness property is NP-hard. Interestingly, with the high
effectiveness property, the prevention function is submodular and thus a Monte Carlo-based
greedy approach (referred to here as MCGreedy) yields approximation guarantees.
We motivate the high effectiveness property with the following two real-world scenarios:
(1) the phenomenon of “death hoaxes” (where celebrities or other notable figures are claimed
to have died) have a strong corrective measure when the victim, or a close relative, makes an
announcement on their personal account that contradicts the rumour and (2) false reporting
of natural disasters can be countered by trusted news organizations providing coverage of
the location of the purported scene. In both cases, the sharing of links to strong video,
photographic, or text evidence that is also coming from a credible source lends itself to
a scenario following the high effectiveness property. In addition to the scenarios we have
outlined, the model is attractive because this assumption leads to interesting theoretical
guarantees. Budak et al. study and obtain results for EIL with the high effectiveness property
and is the problem that we consider in this work.
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I Problem 1. Given G, seed set AC , and a positive integer k, the eventual influence limitation
(EIL) problem asks for a size-k seed set AL maximizing the value of E[pi(AL)] under the
MCIC model with the high effectiveness property.
Possible Worlds Interpretation
To facilitate a better understanding of MCIC, we define a Possible World (PW) model that
provides an equivalent view of the MCIC model and follows a widely used convention when
studying IM and related problems [16, 4, 6, 10, 20, 14, 4, 7, 22]. Given a graph G = (V,E, p)
and the MCIC diffusion model, a possible world X consists of two deterministic graphs, one
for each campaign, sampled from a probability distribution over G. The stochastic diffusion
process under the MCIC model has the following equivalent description: we can interpret
G as a distribution over unweighted directed graphs, where each edge e is independently
realized with probability pC(e) (or pL(e)). Observe, given the high effectivness property, the
deterministic graph that defines the possible world for campaign L is simply the underlying
unweighted graph G. Then, if we realize a graph g according to the probability distribution
given by pC(e), we can associate the set of saved nodes in the original process with the set of
nodes which campaign L reaches before campaign C during a deterministic diffusion process
in g ∼ G by campaign C and in G by campaign L. That is, we can compute the set of saved
nodes with a deterministic cascade in the resulting possible world X = (g,G). The following
theorem from [5] establishes the equivalence between this possible world model and MCIC.
This alternative PW model formulation of the EIL problem under the MCIC model will be
used throughout the paper.
I Theorem 1 ([5]). For any fixed seed sets AC and AL, the joint distributions of the sets
of C-activated nodes and L-activated nodes obtained (i) by running a MCIC diffusion from
AC and AL and (ii) by randomly sampling a possible world X = (g,G) and running a
deterministic cascade from AC in g and AL in G, are the same.
3.2 Reverse Sampling for Influence Maximization
In this section we review the state-of-the-art approach to the well studied influence max-
imization problem (IM). This problem is posed in the popular Independent Cascade model
(IC) which, unlike the MCIC model, only considers a single campaign. The goal here is to
compute a seed set SIM of size k that maximizes the influence of SIM in G. In a small abuse
of notation, this section refers to a possible world as the single deterministic graph g ∼ G
where each edge in G is associated with a single influence probability p(e).
Borgs et al. [3] were the first to propose a novel method for solving the IM problem under
the IC model that avoids the limitations of the original Monte Carlo-based solution [16].
Their approach, which was later refined by Tang et al. [30], is based on the concept of Reverse
Reachable (RR) sets and is orders of magnitude faster than the greedy algorithm with Monte
Carlo simulations, while still providing approximation guarantees with high probability. We
follow the convention of [30] and refer to the method of [3] as Reverse Influence Sampling
(RIS). To explain how RIS works, Tang et al. [30] introduce the following definitions:
I Definition 1 (Reverse Reachable Set). The reverse reachable set for a node v in g ∼ G is
the set of nodes that can reach v. (That is, for each node u in the RR set, there is a directed
path from u to v in g.)
I Definition 2 (Random RR Set). A random RR set is an RR set generated on an instance
of g ∼ G, for a node selected uniformly at random from g.
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Note, a random RR set encapsulates two levels of randomness: (i) a deterministic graph
g ∼ G is sampled where each edge e ∈ E is independently removed with probability (1−p(e)),
and (ii) a “root” node v is randomly chosen from g. The connection between RR sets and
node activation is formalized in the following crucial lemma.
I Lemma 1. [3] For any seed set S and node v, the probability that an influence propagation
process from S can activate v equals the probability that S overlaps an RR set for v.
Based on this result, the RIS algorithm runs in two steps:
1. Generate random RR sets from G until a threshold on the total number of steps taken
has been reached.
2. Consider the maximum coverage problem of selecting k nodes to cover the maximum
number of RR sets generated. Use the standard greedy algorithm for the problem to
derive a (1−1/e)-approximate solution S∗k . Return S∗k as the seed set to use for activation.
The rationale behind RIS is as follows: if a node u appears in a large number of RR
sets it should have a high probability to activate many nodes under the IC model; hence,
u’s expected influence should be large. As such, we can think of the number of RR sets u
appears in as an estimator for u’s expected influence. By the same reasoning, if a size-k node
set S∗k covers most RR sets, then S∗k is likely to have the maximum expected influence among
all size-k node sets in G leading to a good solution to the IM problem. As shown in [30],
Lemma 1 is the key result that underpins the approximation guarantees of RIS. The main
contribution of Borgs et al. is an analysis of their proposed threshold-based approach: RIS
generates RR sets until the total number of nodes and edges examined during the generation
process reaches a pre-defined threshold Γ. Importantly, Γ must be set large enough to ensure
a sufficient number of samples have been generated to provide a good estimator for expected
influence. They show that when Γ is set to Θ((m+ n)k logn/2), RIS runs in near-optimal
time O((m + n)k logn/2), and it returns a (1 − 1/e − )-approximate solution to the IM
problem with at least constant probability.
Due to the more complex dynamics involved in propagation under the MCIC model,
adapting the reverse sampling approach to solve EIL is far from trivial.
4 New Definitions
In this section we introduce new definitions that are crucial to the development of our
approach. In particular, we formalize the notion of obstructed nodes which is required to
capture the necessary conditions for saving a node.
Identifying Saved Nodes
Given set AL of vertices and (unweighted) directed graph g ∼ G, write clg(AL) for the set of
nodes closer to AL in G than to AC in g. That is, a node w ∈ clg(AL) if there exists a node
v such that v ∈ AL and |SPG(v, w)| ≤ |SPg(AC , w)| where SPH(v, w) denotes a shortest
path from node v to w in graph H and SPH(S,w) for a set S denotes the shortest path
from any node v ∈ S to w in graph H. When g is drawn from G this is a necessary, but not
sufficient1, condition for the set of nodes saved by AL. We also require that the nodes in
clg(AL) not be obstructed by the diffusion of campaign C in g.
1 In Budak et al.’s work, the set of nodes closer to AL than AC is established as a necessary and sufficient
condition to save a node in the MCIC model, but we note that this should be revised to include our
obstructed condition due to a gap in the proof of Claim 1 in [4].
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Table 1 Frequently used notation.
Notation Description
G a social network represented as a weighted directed graph G
G, GT
the underlying unweighted graph G and its transpose GT constructed by
reversing the direction of each edge
g
a possible world for campaign C obtained by sampling each edge e ∈ G
independently with probability pC(e)
n, m the number of nodes and edges in G respectively
k the size of the seed set for misinformation prevention
C, L the misinformation campaign C and the limiting campaign L
pC(e), pL(e) the propagation probability on an edge e for campaigns C and L respectively
pi(S) the prevention of a node set S in a misinformation propagation process onG (see Section 4)
ω(R), ωpi(R)
the number of edges considered in generating an RRC set and that originate
from nodes in an RRC set R (see Equation 3)
R the set of all RRC sets generated by Algorithm 1
FR(S) the fraction of RRC sets in R that are covered by a node set S
EPT the expected width of a random RRC set
OPTL the maximum pi(S) for any size-k seed set S
λ see Equation 4
I Definition 3 (Obstructed Nodes). A node w ∈ clg(AL) is obstructed and cannot be saved
by AL if for every path p from AL to w there exists a node u on p such that |SPg(AC , u)| <
|SPG(AL, u)|.
Let obsg(AL) be the set of obstructed nodes for AL. Conceptually, the nodes in obsg(AL)
are cutoff because some node on the paths from AL is reached by campaign C before L
which stops the diffusion of L.
To help illustrate the concept of obstructed nodes, consider the graph presented in Figure
1 and the following possible world instance. Assume that the solid lines are live edges that
make up the deterministic graph g ∼ G for campaign C in the influence propagation process.
The dashed lines are edges that were not realized for campaign C. The adversary campaign C
starts from vc while the limiting campaign L starts from v. Recall, the deterministic graph G
for campaign L in this possible world instance is comprised of both the solid and dashed edges
due to the high effectiveness property. Observe that |SPG(v, w)| = 4 and |SPg(AC , w)| = 5.
However, w cannot be saved in the resulting cascade since at timestamp 1 the node u will
adopt campaign C. This intersects the shortest path from v to w and therefore campaign L
will not be able to reach node w since a node never switches campaigns. Thus, we say that
node w is obstructed by C.
Prevention & Saviours
Next, we formally define the prevention, pi(AL), which corresponds to the number of nodes
saved by AL. That is, pi(AL) = |Rg(AC) ∩ (clg(AL) \ obsg(AL))| where RH(S) is the set
of nodes in graph H that are reachable from set S (a node v in H is reachable from S if
there exists a directed path in H that starts from a node in S and ends at v). We write
E[pi(AL)] = Eg∼G [pi(AL)] for the expected prevention of AL in G. Finally, let OPTL =
maxS:|S|=k{E[pi(S)]} be the maximum expected prevention of a set of k nodes.
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Figure 1 An example illustrating the concept of obstructed nodes where the possible world graph
for campaign C is made up of the solid edges and the possible world for campaign L is made up of
both solid and dashed lines.
We refer to the set of nodes that could have saved u as the saviours of u. A node
w is a candidate saviour for u if there is a directed path from w to u in G (i.e. reverse
reachability). Then, w is a saviour for u subject to the additional constraint that w would
not be cutoff by the diffusion of AC in g. That is, a candidate saviour w would be cutoff and
cannot be a saviour for u if for every path p from w to u there exists a node vb such that
|SPg(AC , vb)| < |SPG(w, vb)|. We refer to the set of candidate saviours for u that are cutoff
as τg(u). Thus, we can define the saviours of u as the set RGT (u) \ τg(u). Therefore, we have:
I Definition 4 (Reverse Reachability without Cutoff Set). The reverse reachability without
cutoff (RRC) set for a node v in g ∼ G is the set of saviour nodes of v, i.e. the set of
nodes that can save v. (That is, for each node u in the RRC set, u ∈ RGT (u) \ τg(u).) If
v 6∈ Rg(AC) then we define the corresponding RRC set as empty since v is not eligible to be
saved.
I Definition 5 (Random RRC Set). A random RRC set is an RRC set generated on an
instance of g ∼ G, for a node selected uniformly at random from g.
Closing the Gap
Before presenting our reverse sampling approach, we make the following remark regarding
obstruction in the context of prior work. The key observation that lead to our definition of
obstructed nodes is that the shortest path condition must hold along the entire path. This
observation was missed by [4] in the MCIC model. Instead, a correct recursive definition
was provided for the set of nodes that are saved, but the resulting characterization based on
shortest paths misses the crucial case of nodes that are obstructed.
Importantly, the solution in [4] can be recovered with a modified proof for Claim 1 and
Theorem 4.2. In particular, the statements must include the notion of obstructed nodes in
their inoculation graph definition, but a careful inspection shows that their objective function
remains submodular after this inclusion. As a result, the greedy approach of [4] still provides
the stated approximation guarantees and also allows us to incorporate the ideas of [3] in our
solution (as [3] requires a submodular objective function as well).
5 Reverse Prevention Sampling
This section presents our misinformation prevention method, Reverse Prevention Sampling
(RPS). At a high level, RPS, in the same spirit as RIS, consists of two steps. In the first
step it derives a parameter θ that ensures a solution of high quality will be produced. In the
second step, using the estimate θ from step one, it generates θ RRC sets and then computes
the maximum coverage on the resulting collection. More precisely, the two steps are:
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1. Parameter Estimation. Compute a lower-bound for the maximum expected preven-
tion among all possible size-k seed sets for AL and then use the lower-bound to derive a
parameter θ.
2. Node Selection. Sample θ random RRC sets from G to form a set R and then compute
a size-k seed set S∗k that covers a large number of RRC sets in R. Return S∗k as the final
result.
In the rest of this section, we first tackle the challenging task of correctly generating RRC
sets in the Node Selection step under the MCIC model. Next, we identify the conditions
necessary for the Node Selection of RPS to return a solution of good quality and then
describe how these conditions are achieved in the Parameter Estimation phase. Table 1
provides a reference to some of the frequently used notation. All proofs can be found in the
full version [28].
Node Selection
The pseudocode of RPS ’s Node Selection step is presented in Algorithm 1. Given G, k,
AC , and a constant θ as input, the algorithm stochastically generates θ random RRC sets,
accomplished by repeated invocation of the prevention of misinformation process, and inserts
them into a set R. Next, the algorithm follows a greedy approach for the maximum coverage
problem to select the final seed set. In each iteration, the algorithm selects a node vi that
covers the largest number of RRC sets in R, and then removes all those covered RRC sets
from R. The k selected nodes are put into a set S∗k , which is returned as the final result.
Algorithm 1 NodeSelection(G,k,AC ,θ).
1: R ← ∅
2: Generate θ random RRC sets and insert them into R.
3: Initialize a node set S∗k ← ∅
4: for i = 1,. . . ,k do
5: Identify the node vi that covers the most RRC sets in R
6: Add vi into S∗k
7: Remove from R all RRC sets that are covered by vi
8: return S∗k
Lines 4-8 in Algorithm 1 correspond to a standard greedy approach for a maximum
coverage problem. The problem is equivalent to maximizing a submodular function with
cardinality constraints for which it is well known that a greedy approach returns a (1− 1/e)-
approximate solution in linear time [21].
5.1 RRC set generation
Next, we describe how to generate RRC sets correctly for the EIL problem under the MCIC
model, which is more complicated than generating RR sets for the IC model [30]. The
construction of RRC sets is done according to Definition 4. Recall that in the MCIC model,
whether a node can be saved or not is based on a number of factors such as whether v is
reachable via a path in g ∼ G from AC and the diffusion history of each campaign. Our
algorithms tackle the complex interactions between campaigns by first identifying nodes that
can be influenced by C which reveals important information for generating RRC sets for L.
Line 2 generates R by repeated simulation of the misinformation prevention process. The
generation of each random RRC set is implemented as two breath-first searches (BFS) on G
and GT respectively. The first BFS is a forward labelling process from AC implemented as a
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forward BFS on G that computes the influence set of AC in a possible world. The second
BFS on GT is a novel bounded-depth BFS with pruning that carefully tracks which nodes
will become obstructed and is described in detail below.
Forward BFS with Lazy Sampling
We first describe the forward labelling process. As the forward labeling is unlikely to reach
the whole graph, we simply reveal edge states on demand (“lazy sampling”), based on
the principle of deferred decisions. Given the seed set AC of campaign C, we perform a
randomized BFS starting from AC where each outgoing edge e in G is traversed with pC(e)
probability. The set of nodes traversed in this manner (Rg(AC)) is equivalent to I(AC) for
g ∼ G, due to deferred randomness. Note that in each step of the above BFS we record at
each node w the minimum distance from AC to w, denoted D(w), for use in the second BFS.
Given a randomly selected node u in G, observe that for u to be able to be saved we
require u ∈ Rg(AC). Therefore, if the randomly selected node u 6∈ Rg(AC) then we return an
empty RRC set. On the other hand, if u ∈ Rg(AC), we have D(u) = |SPg(AC , u)| as a result
of the above randomized BFS which indicates the maximum distance from u that candidate
saviour nodes can exist. We run a second BFS from u in GT to depth D(u) to determine the
saviour nodes for u by carefully pruning those nodes that would become obstructed.
Bounded-depth BFS with Pruning
The second BFS on GT , presented in Algorithm 2, takes as input a source node u, the
maximum depth D(u), and a directed graph GT . Algorithm 2 utilizes special indicator
values associated with each node w to account for potential cutoffs from C. Each node w
holds a variable, β(w), which indicates the distance beyond w that the BFS can go before
the diffusion would have been cutoff by C propagating in g. The β value for each node w
is initialized to D(w). In each round, the current node w has an opportunity to update
the β value of each of its successors only if β(w) > 0. For each successor z of w, we assign
β(z) = β(w)−1 if β(z) = null or if β(z) > 0 and β(w)−1 < β(z). In this way, each ancestor
of z will have an opportunity to apply a β value to z to ensure that if any ancestor has a β
value then so will z and furthermore, the β variable for z will be updated with the smallest
β value from its ancestors. We terminate the BFS early if we reach a node w with β(w) = 0.
Figure 2 captures the primary scenarios encountered by Algorithm 2 when initialized at u.
The enclosing dotted line represents the extent of the influence of campaign C for the current
influence propagation process. First, notice that if the BFS moves away from AC = {vc}, as
in the case of node z, that, once we move beyond the influence boundary of C, there will be
no potential for cutoff. As such, the BFS is free to traverse until the maximum depth D(u) is
reached. On the other hand, if the BFS moves towards (or perpendicular to) vc then we must
carefully account for potential cutoff. For example, when the BFS reaches v, we know the
distance from vc to v: D(v) = SPg(vc, v). Therefore, the BFS must track the fact that there
cannot exist saviours at a distance D(v) beyond v. In other words, if we imagine initializing
a misinformation prevention process from a node w such that SPG(v, w) > D(v) then v will
adopt campaign C before campaign L can reach v. Therefore, at each out-neighbour of v
we use the knowledge of D(v) to track the distance beyond v that saviours can exist. This
updating process tracks the smallest such value and is allowed to cross the enclosing influence
boundary of campaign C ensuring that all potential for cutoff is tracked.
Finally, we collect all nodes visited during the process (including u), and use them to
form an RRC set. The runtime of this procedure is precisely the sum of the degrees (in G)
of the nodes in Rg(AC) plus the sum of the degrees of the nodes in RGT (u) \ τ(u).











Figure 2 An overview of the primary scenarios encountered by Algorithm 2.
We briefly note another key difference between RPS and RIS occurs in the RRC set
generation step. Unlike in the single campaign setting, generating an RRC set is comprised of
two phases instead of just one. First, we are required to simulate the spread of misinformation
since being influenced by campaign C is a pre-condition for being saved. As a result, only a
fraction of the simulation steps of RPS provide signal for the prevention value we are trying
to estimate. This difference is made concrete in the running time analysis to follow.
Algorithm 2 generateRRC(u, D(u), GT ).
1: let R← ∅, Q be a queue and Q.enqueue(u)
2: set u.depth = 0 and label u as discovered
3: while Q is not empty do
4: w ← Q.dequeue(), R← R ∪ {w}
5: if w.depth = D(u) OR β(w) = 0 then
6: continue
7: for all nodes z in GT .adjacentEdges(w) do
8: if β(w) > 0 AND β(z) > 0 then
9: if β(w)− 1 < β(z) then
10: β(z)← β(w)− 1
11: else if β(w) > 0 then
12: β(z)← β(w)− 1
13: if z is not labelled as discovered then
14: set z.depth = w.depth+ 1, label z as discovered and Q.enqueue(z)
15: return R
5.2 Analysis
In this section we focus on two parameters: solution quality and runtime. For Algorithm
1 to return a solution with approximation guarantee, we will provide a lower bound on θ.
Then, we will analyze the running time of the algorithm in terms of θ and a quantity EPT
that captures the expected number of edges traversed when generating a random RRC set.
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Approximation Guarantee
We begin by establishing the crucial connection between RRC sets and the prevention process
on G. That is, the prevention of a set of nodes S is precisely n times the probability that a
node u, chosen uniformly at random, has a saviour from S.
I Lemma 2. For any seed set S and any node v, the probability that a prevention process
from S can save v equals the probability that S overlaps an RRC set for v.
For any node set S, let FR(S) be the fraction of RRC sets in R covered by S. Then,
based on Lemma 2, we can prove that the expected value of n · FR(S) equals the expected
prevention of S in G.
I Corollary 1. E[n · FR(S)] = E[pi(S)]
Corollary 1 implies that we can estimate E[pi(S)] by estimating the fraction of RRC sets
in R covered by S. The number of sets covered by a node v in R is precisely the number of
times we observed that v was a saviour for a randomly selected node u. We can therefore
think of n · FR(S) as an estimator for E[pi(S)]. Our primary task is to show that it is a good
estimator. Using Chernoff bounds, we show that n · FR(S) is an accurate estimator of any
node set S’s expected prevention, when θ is sufficiently large:
I Lemma 3. Suppose that θ satisfies






OPTL · 2 (1)
Then, for any set S of at most k nodes, the following inequality holds with at least
1− n−l/(nk) probability:∣∣∣n · FR(S)− E[pi(S)]∣∣∣ < 2 ·OPTL (2)
Based on Lemma 3, we prove that if Eqn. 1 holds, Algorithm 1 returns a (1− 1/e− )-
approximate solution with high probability by a simple application of Chernoff bounds.
I Theorem 2. Given a θ that satisfies Equation 1, Algorithm 1 returns a (1 − 1/e − )-
approximate solution with at least 1− n−l probability.
Runtime
First, we will define EPT which captures the expected number of edges traversed when
generating a random RRC set. After that, we define the expected runtime of RPS in terms
of EPT and the parameter θ.
Let MR be the instance of Rg(AC) used in computing an RRC set R. Then, we define
the width of an RRC set R, denoted as ω(R), as the number of edges in G that point to








Let EPT be the expected width of a random RRC set, where the expectation is taken
over the randomness in R and MR, and observe that Algorithm 1 has an expected runtime
of O(θ ·EPT ). This can be observed by noting that EPT captures the expected number of
edge traversals required to generate a random RRC set since an edge is only considered in
the propagation process (either of the two BFS’s) if it points to a node in R or originates
from a node in MR.
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An important consideration is that, since OPTL is unknown, we cannot set θ directly
from Equation 1. For simplicity, we define










and rewrite Equation 1 as θ ≥ λ/OPTL. In the parameter estimation step we employ
the techniques of [30] to derive a θ value for RPS that is above the threshold but also allows
for practical efficiency.
5.3 Parameter Estimation
Our objective in this section is to identify a θ that makes θ · EPT reasonably small, while
still ensuring θ ≥ λ/OPTL. We begin with some definitions. Let V∗ be a probability
distribution over the nodes in G, such that the probability mass for each node is proportional
to its indegree in G. Let v∗ be a random variable following V∗ and recall that MR is a
random instance of Rg(AC) that is equivalent to the influence I(AC) for a possible world g.
Furthermore, define ω(MR), the number of edges in G that originate from nodes in MR, as
ω(MR) =
∑
u∈MR outdegreeG(u). Then we prove the following.
I Lemma 4. mn · E[pi({v∗})] = EPT − E[ω(MR)], where the expectation of pi({v∗}) and
ω(MR) is taken over the randomness in v∗ and the prevention process.
Lemma 4 shows that if we randomly sample a node from V∗ and calculate its expected
prevention p, then on average we have p = nm (EPT − E[ω(MR)]). This implies that
n
m (EPT − E[ω(MR)]) ≤ OPTL, since OPTL is the maximum expected prevention of any
size-k node set.
Recall that the expected runtime complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(θ ·EPT ). Now, suppose
we are able to identify a parameter t such that t = Ω( nm (EPT − E[ω(MR)])) and t ≤ OPTL.
Then, by setting θ = λ/t, we can guarantee that Algorithm 1 is correct, since θ ≥ λ/OPTL,
and has an expected runtime complexity of









m (EPT − E[ω(MR)])
)
(5)
Furthermore, if we define a ratio γ ∈ (0, 1) which captures the relationship between









= O((k + l)(m+ n)(1/(1− γ)) logn/2) (6)
Note that γ is a data-dependent approximation factor not present in [30], but arises from
the MCIC model. In particular, the RRC set generation relies crucially on first computing
the spread of misinformation from campaign C in order to determine the set of nodes that
can be saved. See Section 6 for a detailed discussion of γ.
Computing t
We postpone the details of how to derive t = Ω( nm (EPT −E[ω(MR)])), a lower bound for the
optimal prevention value, to the full version of the paper [28]. Briefly, we mimic the adaptive
sampling approach of [30], which estimates a lower bound LB by dynamically adjusting the
number of measurements based on the observed values of LB. The runtime required for the
lower bound estimation is linear in Equation 6.
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Wrapping Up
As a result, by Equation 6, RPS runs in O((k+ l)(m+ n)(1/(1− γ)) logn/2) expected time.
Furthermore, by Theorem 2 and the lower bound estimation, RPS returns a (1− 1/e− )-
approximate solution with at least 1− 3n−l probability and the success probability can be
increased to 1− n−l by scaling l up by a factor of 1 + log 3/ logn.
Finally, we note that the time complexity of RPS is near-optimal up to the instance-
specific factor γ under the MCIC model, as it is only a ( 11−γ ) logn factor larger than the
Ω(m+ n) lower-bound proved in Section 6 (for fixed k, l, and ).
6 Lower Bounds
Comparison with MCGreedy
MCGreedy runs in O(kmnr) time, where r is the number of Monte Carlo samples used to
estimate the expected prevention of each node set. Budak et al. do not provide a detailed
analysis related to how r should be set to achieve a (1 − 1/e − )-approximation ratio in
the MCIC model, only pointing out that when each estimation of expected prevention has 
relative error, MCGreedy returns a (1 − 1/e − ′)-approximate solution for a particular ′
[4]. In the following lemma, we present a more precise characterization of the relationship
between r and MCGreedy’s approximation ratio in the MCIC model.
I Lemma 5. MCGreedy returns a (1− 1/e− )-approximate solution with at least 1− n−l
probability, if
r ≥ (8k2 + 2k) · n · (l + 1) logn+ log k
2 ·OPTL (7)
Assume that we know OPTL in advance and set r to the smallest value satisfying the
above inequality, in MCGreedy’s favour. In that case, the time complexity of MCGreedy is
O(k3lmn2−2 logn/OPTL). Towards comparing MCGreedy to RPS, we show the following
upper bound on the value of γ.
I Claim 1. γ ≤ nn+1
Claim 1 shows that the expected runtime for RPS is at most O((k + l)mn−2 logn). As
a consequence, given that OPTL ≤ n, the expected runtime of MCGreedy is always more
than the expected runtime of RPS. In practice, we observe that for typical social networks
OPTL  n and 11−γ  n+ 1 resulting in superior scalability of RPS compared to MCGreedy.
A Lower Bound for EIL
In the theorem below, we provide a lower bound on the time it takes for any algorithm
to compute a β-approximation for the EIL problem given uniform node sampling and an
adjacency list representation. Thus, we rule out the possibility of a sublinear time algorithm
for the EIL problem for an arbitrary β.
I Theorem 3. Let 0 <  < 110e , β ≤ 1 be given. Any randomized algorithm for EIL that
returns a set of seed nodes with approximation ratio β, with probability at least 1 − 1e − ,
must have a runtime of at least β(m+n)24min{k,1/β} .
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7 Generalization to the Multi-Campaign Triggering Model
The triggering model is an influence propagation model that generalizes the IC and LT
models. It assumes that each node v is associated with a triggering distribution T (v) over the
power set of v’s incoming neighbors. An influence propagation process under the triggering
model works as follows: (1) for each node v, take a sample from T (v) and define the sample
as the triggering set of v, then (2) at timestep 1 activate the seed set S, and (3) in subsequent
timesteps, if an active node appears in the triggering set of v, then v becomes active. The
propagation terminates when no more nodes can be activated.
We can define a multi-campaign version of the triggering model (MCT) that generalizes
the MCIC model by associating each node with a campaign-specific triggering distribution
TZ(v) where Z ∈ {C,L}. The propagation process under MCT proceeds exactly as under
MCIC with the exception that activation between rounds (step 2) is determined by TC(v)
and TL(v). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to formally define a multi-campaign
version of the triggering model.
The key aspect of the MCIC model that enabled the existence of obstructed nodes is that
the two campaigns are allowed to propagate along different sets of edges in a possible world
X. This is exactly the intuition captured by the example in Figure 1 and is caused by L
and C having separate propagation probabilities in G. As a result, the campaigns traverse
potentially unique graphs in X and results in the possibility of the obstruction of L by C.
This observation holds under the more general setting of MCT due to the campaign-specific
triggering sets and so the obstruction phenomenon exists under the MCT model.
Following the observations made in [30], our solutions can be easily extended to operate
under the multi-campaign triggering (MCT) model with a modified high effectiveness property.
Under MCT, the high effectiveness property asserts that TL(v) = in(v) where in(v) is the
set of in-neighbours of v in G. Observe that Algorithm 1 does not rely on anything specific
to the MCIC model, except a subroutine to generate random RRC sets. Thus, we can revise
the definition of RRC sets to accommodate the MCT model.
Due to space constraints, we delay the details showing that this revised solution retains
the performance guarantees of RPS under the MCT model to the full version of the paper.
However, we note that all of the theoretical analysis of RPS is based on the Chernoff bounds
and Lemma 2, without relying on any other results specific to the MCIC model. Therefore,
once we establish an equivalent to Lemma 2, it is straightforward to combine it with the
Chernoff bounds to show that, under the MCT model, RPS provides the same performance
guarantees as in the case of the MCIC model. Thus, we have the following theorem:
I Theorem 4. Under MCT, RPS runs in O((k + l)(m + n)(1/(1 − γ)) logn/2) expected
time, and returns a (1− 1/e− )-approximate solution with at least 1− 3n−l probability.
8 Summary of Experiments
The focus of our experiments is algorithm efficiency measured in runtime where our goal
is to demonstrate the superior performance of RPS compared to MCGreedy. We observe
that RPS provides a significant improvement of several orders of magnitude over MCGreedy.
Further, we confirm that 11−γ  n+ 1 on our small datasets which is strong evidence that
RPS will outperform MCGreedy on typical social networks. Finally, we observe that the vast
majority of the computation time is spent on generating the RRC sets for R. A detailed
experimental analysis and discussion is provided in the full version [28].
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9 Conclusion & Future Work
In this work we presented RPS, a novel and scalable approach to the EIL problem. We
showed the correctness and a detailed running-time analysis of our approach. Furthermore,
we provided two lower bound results: one on the running-time requirement for any approach
to solve the EIL problem and another on the number of Monte Carlo simulations required
by MCGreedy to return a correct solution with high probability. As a result, the expected
runtime of RPS is always less than the expected runtime of MCGreedy. Finally, we describe
how our approach can be generalized to a multi-campaign triggering model. In future work
we plan to investigate how to adapt our approach to a scenario where the source of the
misinformation is only partially known.
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